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8:37 am, Sep 05, 2023

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----X Docket#

JENNA MARIE DUNCAN, : 22-cv-07841-GRB-AYS

Plaintiff,

- versus - : U.S. Courthouse

: Central Islip, New York

KAHALA FRANCHISING, LLC,

: July 25, 2023

Defendant : 2:00 p.m.

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TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR PRE-MOTION CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GARY R. BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

A P P E A R A N C E S: (VIA VIDEO/AUDIO)

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              THE CLERK: Calling case CV-22-7841, Duncan v.
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   Kahala Franchising, LLC.
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              Counsel, please state your appearance for the
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   record.
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              MR. NASSIR: Good afternoon, your Honor.
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   is Joshua Nassir on behalf of plaintiff Duncan.
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              MR. WILLEMS: Good afternoon, your Honor. Kyle
   Willems, W-I-L-E-M-S, along with my colleague Bryce
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   Riddle and local counsel Glen Greenberg on behalf of
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   defendant Kahala Franchising.
              THE COURT: Great who'll take the lead on this?
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              MR. WILLEMS: I will, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
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              All right. Counsel, we're here for a pre-
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   motion conference. You've both done a great job, you've
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   all done a good job on the papers so I am sort of
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    familiar with this and I do reserve the right to decide
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   the motion, deem it made and decide it. I don't know if
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   I'll do that today or not, but that means you should feel
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   free to make all your arguments.
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              So let me go to defense first because you want
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   to make the motion, so why don't you outline it for me,
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   please?
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              MR. WILLEMS: Sure.
                                   Thank you, your Honor.
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   Well, really this case and this motion hinges on what is
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reasonable for a consumer in the circumstances pled in plaintiff's complaint?

In this case, the question is what is reasonable for a consumer as a broad member of the public when they went into a Cold Stone Creamery in New York and purchased ice cream from a tub that had a placard on it that said pistachio?

And based on plaintiff's arguments, which really hinge on Sections 349 and 350 of New York's General Business Law, that's basically the Deceptive Trade Practices, that it comes down to what that consumer faces when they purchase that product. In the complaint there's a picture of the tubs of ice cream with the placard with each flavor.

What I'd like to do briefly, your Honor, is show that even under Rule 12's heightened pleading standard there are really no issues of factor law that need to be resolved through discovery or some other mechanism. And to show that, I'm going to quickly go through the claims for relief.

As I mentioned before, the main claims for relief are claims 1 and 2 which is those trade practices claims.

The first one is Section 349. So that deals with, and I quote, "Deceptive acts or practices in the

4 Proceedings 1 conduct of any business, trade or commerce. 2 THE COURT: Yes. 3 MR. WILLEMS: Section 350 is very similar. 4 It's false advertising. And your Honor, I'm sorry, I'll 5 try and paraphrase because I know you know this. 6 THE COURT: No, counsel, just to tell you I've 7 written on similar cases, right? I've written a lot of 8 349, 350 cases including some in the sort of consumer purchasing context, so I am familiar with the background. 9 10 I guess I would jump ahead a little bit. I'm 11 going to try to direct you. 12 I think you've got a problem on your standing 13 argument. In other words, I think the Second Circuit 14 case law here is such that if there's a claim on the 15 statute, she didn't have to purchase the mango and so 16 forth to make this all work. I think Second Circuit case 17 law suggests otherwise. 18 But I'm much more interested in your argument 19 about whether a consumer buying pistachio ice cream, and 20 the only representation in the complaint is a picture, 21 one word, pistachio on a tub of ice cream, whether they 22 should expect pistachio ingredients, real pistachio in 23 there. And I'm looking at the cases from the southern 24 district on vanilla, but then there's the Blueberry Bagel 25 They don't all seem to square up to me. So where

5 Proceedings 1 does this fall on that continuum? 2 MR. WILLEMS: Well, your Honor, that's right 3 where I was going so I'm glad you asked that because I 4 spent a lot of time reading these cases to figure out 5 what makes a case fall under the camp of justifying being 6 dismissed on a Rule 12 and what justifies a case 7 surviving a Rule 12. And there are a few key things that 8 these cases have in common, and not just by my impression, but they actually expressly say that. 9 10 So let's talk about the cases that courts have 11 routinely held should be dismissed on Rule 12 in these 12 circumstances. 13 So the standard is not really at issue. Right? 14 We all understand it's a reasonable consumer test. 15 look to see if there's something that's material, 16 misleading, and you look to the context, the whole 17 context, and this is important, of the experience that 18 that consumer had. 19 Now, I'll just give another example. Right? 20 So if you buy vitamin supplements or something like that, 21 you look at not just the front of the bottle but you 22 rotate it around. What do the ingredients say? And you 23 make a determination as to what is reasonable. 24 And so there's one thing that is not in the 25 parties' letter that I do quickly want to bring to the

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Court's attention before I talk about whether this case falls under the camp of should it be dismissed or not.

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Since we drafted our letter briefs to the Court we've had Kahala Franchising investigate the underlying facts because to be honest, your Honor, I know this isn't legally persuasive to say, but I've been a regular customer of Cold Stone and what my recollection of what Cold Stone is famous for is you go there, you see tubs of ice cream. Above it are boards that say -- you could do two things pretty much. You can pick a recommended sundae, so it'll have a picture of let's say vanilla ice cream with chocolate sauce and Heath bars pounded into it, or you can make your own. And so it'll have a threestep. It'll say pick your flavor. So you look at the tubs, you pick your flavor. Then they take that ice cream and they actually slap it on, you know, the proverbial cold stone and they use these metal, I don't know, they kind of look like flippers. They bash in the ingredients you pick, or they call them mix ins, and then you put it in a cup.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, I have to interrupt you one second. I guess in the way of full and fair disclosure, I am familiar with the process. Right? So I haven't done it in a number of years, but I have been there and watched them lather the ice cream together

7 Proceedings with the chips so they're not so whatever and I have 1 2 been through that. So I'll just put that out there for 3 you. MR. WILLEMS: Well thank you, your Honor. 4 5 Well, I bring that up not to bore you but because we just 6 sent a letter to counsel which in fairness to counsel, 7 I'm sure he hasn't had a chance to read it because I sent 8 it last night and this has been developing for us 9 quickly. But we had the store reps send us pictures and 10 be able to tell us that they'll be able to testify as to 11 what the actual shopping experience would have been 12 because the case law says even if it's not in the 13 complaint, we have to look at the full context. It's 14 kind of unique in a Rule 12 analysis like that. And then 15 the full context will show to the Court, if we get to 16 bring our motion, that what is contained in the 17 complaint, which is simply that plaintiff was presented 18 with a placard that said pistachio and this bin of 19 pistachio ice cream isn't actually what she was presented 20 with. She walked in and it was just like my experience, 21 right directly above that was a sign that says pick your 22 flavor. 23 And so why is that important? Well, looking at 24 the whole context, the gravamen of this complaint is that

there was no indication that this was anything but

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pistachio ice cream that may have contained real pistachios. And that is, quite frankly, untrue. There's literally a sign above it that says pick your flavor and add your mash-ins, or whatever you call it. And the thing next to those tubs of ice cream is all the things you can have it added to it.

And so that's one thing I want to add. But then turning to which camp does this fall in regardless, the cases that generally get dismissed have these things in common. And again, this is case law, not just my impression.

First, that they don't have anything on the packaging or in the advertisements that say the words something like contains or sometimes it's made with, anything that indicates it actually contains the ingredient that the flavor may be mimicking.

The second thing is whether or not the word at issue can be used as simply a noun or both as a noun or an adjective.

So that's kind of the center of the vanilla cases. Vanilla can be a flavor and it can be an ingredient. Vice versa if you look at the *Colpitts* case that plaintiffs rely on, it talks about a smokehouse flavor of an almond, but it can't be both. It can't be the noun and the adjective. So that's the next huge

differentiator.

And then again, when you look at the whole context, is there anything that indicates it's a flavor? In this case, well we're going to present to the Court there's a sign that says it is in fact a flavor.

So I would say when you look at those three things, this falls squarely into the camp of the cases that tend to have these claims dismissed.

Now, what does the other camp look like? Your Honor, you brought up the blueberries case which was about a blueberry bagel. And so in that case, you naturally see what you may think the ingredient is. In that case, the plaintiff picked up a blueberry bagel and it had chunks in it, what appeared to be blueberry. Well, it turns out that was not the case. So that's one example of actually indicating that something contains an ingredient.

That's not the case here. If you look at the picture, it's just this green goop and frankly, you look at all the other flavors, there's no chunks of anything in them.

The next would be, again, that the product advertises made with or contains. That might help get over a Rule 12 analysis but that's not the case here.

So that would be -- I want to differentiate

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those two camps to explain the difference between why I think this case on the merits should be dismissed versus some of the cases that have dealt with I would say deceptive flavoring issues and has not been dismissed.

I will stop talking for a second about the deceptive trade claims to see, your Honor, do you have any questions on that?

THE COURT: No, I'm good. Keep going.

MR. WILLEMS: Okay. The next claim then is the expressed warranty claim. Well, obviously under the UCC and expressed warranty, there actually has to be an expressed warranty to set the basis for a claim. In this case, the plaintiffs have not specifically pled what is that expressed warranty or what is that affirmative factor promise that the buyer will relate to the goods that becomes part of the bargain?

I think this would be a different case, again, if it said something made with real pistachio or something like that, but that's not the case literally. Even if we just take the complaint on its face, it just says pistachio and nothing else. So I don't see an expressed warranty that actually says by purchasing this product you are getting something that says it contains actual pistachio, nor is that anywhere in the complaint.

Turning to the claim for a breach of implied

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warranty, frankly, it largely has the same problem. You know, an implied warranty says that -- really focuses on the merchantability of the good and does it conform, this is a direct quote, "to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container label."

Again, in this case, there is nothing that says that this product contains or implies in any meaningful fashion that it contains real pistachio. More importantly, even if it did, does this product no longer become merchantable?

In one case, one of the vanilla cases, it talked about soy milk and saying okay, the products may not contain the requisite levels of real soy that plaintiffs are complaining of, but is it literally unfit to drink? Is it unfit to have a vanilla flavor? The answer is no.

The last issue is the unjust enrichment claim. Courts are pretty clear on that in cases cited by both parties that if the claims are merely duplicative of the other claims, it should not stand. I think plaintiff's argument is that well we're pleading it in the alternative, which they do have a right to do. But again, if you look at the unjust enrichment allegations compared to the others, it actually does just mirror those claims. And so even if we dismiss those claims,

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could plaintiffs get over these same humps that they had before which is that did the full context of the products that they were presented with materially mislead them as would a reasonable consumer? I think you'd have to apply that test. And I don't see how they get over that hurdle for the reasons they've already bemoaned earlier.

So your Honor, we would like to reserve bringing a standard argument but I'm not going to rest on that today. I'd like to just preserve that right. But I think we don't have to get that far because if we just look strictly on the merits of the claims, there's no issue of law or facts for this Court to resolve even if we rely on the pleadings.

THE COURT: Excellent. Counsel, thank you so much. Let me go to your adversary. What would you like to argue in response, please?

MR. NASSIR: Thank you, your Honor. Just to go in line with everything, as to standing, you know, I think as your Honor acknowledged, the Second Circuit and other circuits recognize whenever there's a similar type of injury in advertising, the plaintiff has standing to purchase un-purchased products.

But to move on to the substance, I think the key here is almost what defendant said. Look at the context. And what the defendant is trying to do is that

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they're trying to characterize a very specific type of case which they even admit has been monitored, the SDNY vanilla cases, because they've been brought by one attorney, and to apply that very narrow type of case to any consumer case regarding ingredients, and I think that's improper. And if you look at the context of what this case is about, it doesn't fit.

The vanilla cases, and I believe I put the citation in our letter, the courts have recognized that vanilla is very specific in the sense that it usually does it as a flavor. It's usually seen as a flavor. For example, if you're buying a vanilla creamer, you're not going to expect them to scrape out some vanilla beans in there. If you're buying a vanilla cookie, you're not going to expect some vanilla beans scraped in the cookie. And these cases differentiate between what's typically an ingredient and what's typically a flavor.

And the products at issue in this case, pistachio ice cream, mango, coconut, orange, these are typically ingredients. And I think again, and you can look at the context, Cold Stone's a premium brand, which all this is alleged in the complaint, Cold Stone's a premium brand. It's expensive. And even cheaper ice cream brands such as Thrifty, I believe it's called Rite Aid in New York, for example, their ice cream contains

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1 pistachio. And this is what consumers are accustomed to. 2 They're accustomed to ice cream containing the 3 ingredients that they say. And I think that's what the 4 difference is. We're not talking about a flavor like 5 vanilla, we're talking about something that is typically 6 an ingredient. And this is what consumers are accustomed 7 to. And it's not that, you know, Cold Stone never has an 8 ingredient in their ice creams. For example, as we allege in the complaint, their strawberry ice cream 9 10 contains strawberry. The banana ice cream contains 11 banana. And you know, by using defendant's logic, you 12 know, saying oh by the appearance you wouldn't be able to tell, I mean look, their banana ice cream, as you see in 13

And I think what's important here is we look at what is the type of product we're talking about. We're talking about a premium ice cream. And as the complaint alleges, ice cream typically has the ingredient that it's named after.

the complaint, it's banana colored, it looks like banana

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and it has banana.

And to address the pick your flavor, that was a letter that we received last night where they claim that on the wall it says pick your flavor. Again, first, this is outside the four corners of the complaint, but I don't think it's an issue so I'd like to address it.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NASSIR: It's specific to ice cream. Ice cream is typically referred to as flavors despite ice cream typically containing the ingredients that they're named after just as how defendant's banana ice cream contains banana. For some reason, there is a select number of products that don't have the ingredients they're named after. It's not what consumers expect when they purchase ice cream, let alone premium ice cream. And defendant is trying to seek a premature determination that for some reason with these premium ice creams consumers wouldn't expect the ingredients.

So I would say at this stage we've shown that it's at least plausible that a consumer can look at this premium ice cream and expect the ingredient they're promised especially whenever cheaper brands can live up to their name.

I think I'll leave it at that on the reasonable consumer front.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NASSIR: As for the warranties, I think your Honor knows they pretty much rise and fall with the GBL claims but the one thing that I would like to address is about it being fit for consumption and merchantable. That is not what the courts follow.

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We cite two cases in that regard, Goldenberg v. Johnson & Johnson and Hesse v. Godiva. I have personal experience with the Godiva case and I could tell you with that case that was not an issue. It's simply whether it conforms with the advertising. Whether it's merchantable is I believe a separate subsection of the warranty statute. The courts never looked at whether it's merchantable. And I think you can just take a look at that case we cite, Hesse v. Godiva, that'll make that clear.

As for unjust enrichment, I think defendant characterized that we believe that under Rule 8 we just have a right to plead claims in the alternative and it would be premature to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim at this stage.

THE COURT: Okay. Well --

MR. NASSIR: And do you have any questions?

THE COURT: Yes, I do actually. I have a

19 | couple of things. You used the phrase a couple of times,

20 | several times, of this being a premium ice cream. I

21 | happen to have a recollection, and I'm not going to

22 depend on this to decide the case, but it's something I

23 | just want to raise with you. You know, as your adversary

24 pointed out Cold Stone, as I recall, I haven't been there

25 | in a long time, but part of the fact that it was a little

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more costly than other ice cream retailers was that there's an experience aspect. In other words, you go in and they take the ice cream and they mix things in, they flip it around, and it's like a little bit of a show kind of a -- which has been a marketing (indiscernible) for a while.

My question is when you call it premium ice cream, I mean if you were to re-plead this, do you have evidence that says they only use actual ingredients or that there are representations made about the nature of the ingredients that makes it a premium ice cream? Or is it just the price point?

MR. NASSIR: Good question, your Honor. When we say premium, we're referring to the price. And that's also what I was getting at when comparing the ice cream to, for example, Thrifty, where the ice cream is much cheaper. And you know, there's still the ingredients in the cheaper ice cream. Yeah, by premium I'm talking about the price point.

THE COURT: Okay. And then the other question I was going to ask you, you plead in the complaint, in the four corners of the complaint, when you go to the website you can see there isn't any pistachio in there. My question to you is from a 349, 350 perspective, doesn't that actually aid the defendants in the sense

that they're not concealing this? In other words, in a world of smart phones, while you're on line if you wanted to, you could check to see is there pistachio in there? And you see no, actually not. Doesn't that help them in some ways?

MR. NASSIR: That's a very good question, your Honor. I think the answer is no. And I'll be happy to brief this further if you'd like. The Second Circuit decision in *Mantikas* followed --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NASSIR: -- the Ninth Circuit decision in Williams where consumers, in that case, they're not expected to check, for example, the side or back label of products if there's a plausibly deceptive representation on the front. And we're talking about online, that's an even greater burden.

I can tell you a case I actually litigated,

Rose v. HP in the Northern District of California dealt

with online disclosures. And there's a plethora of cases

that say that if there's a plausibly deceptive

representation, consumers aren't required to look online

to check. I don't think any reasonable consumer is going

to be standing in the line at Cold Stone, there's someone

behind them waiting to order ice cream, and they say hm,

I wonder, let me pull out my smart phone and go on the

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website and go on the ingredients list.

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So I would say it's not reasonable concern to be able to do that and there's a plethora of authority out there that say that consumers aren't expected to go online to cross check these types of representations.

THE COURT: Okay. And then the last question I would ask you is how was your client harmed?

MR. NASSIR: Sure. So again, it goes to -it's essentially a price premium. It's that if this ice cream was advertised correctly, it would be cheaper. my client, as well as other putative class members, have paid a premium for the product based on its advertising. And the way it plays out is, you know, if this case were to progress and it were go to class certification, we would hire an economist to do what's called a hedonic regression analysis. And what they do is they'll parse out like hey, this ice cream has a bundle of sticks of values between the name and the taste and the price. And then one of those pieces of value would be the perception that the pistachio ice cream has pistachio for example. And that maybe instead of -- I apologize, your Honor, I don't have the prices in front of me, but I'll give you just a hypothetical example. Instead of \$5 a scoop it should be \$4.50 a scoop or \$4 a scoop. And it's that difference in price based on this deception that my

20 Proceedings 1 client and other putative class members were injured. 2 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 3 Would defendants like to make any reply? MR. WILLEMS: Just briefly, your Honor. I 4 5 think cause frankly on the depths of the law that are 6 underlying what we're talking about, it seems we're all 7 in agreement which is you have to look at the full context. And so, you know, the product and the context 8 9 and what the product is marketed. So that includes the website. 10 11 But most importantly, as I talked about 12 earlier, and this was the Fink v. Time Warner case that's actually cited by plaintiffs, that means that if the 13 14 complaint, and I quote, misquotes or misleads an excerpt 15 of the advertising, we have to look at the full context 16 and we can bring that in. And I think we don't have to 17 It's already on its face enough to show that 18 there is no reasonable confusion here. But that's 19 something I want to note. 20 The other thing I think to end it was, this is 21 a direct quote from opposing counsel during his comments, 22 he says ice cream is commonly referred to as flavors. 23 And I think that's kind of the nail in the coffin as I

he says ice cream is commonly referred to as flavors.

And I think that's kind of the nail in the coffin as I look at it because the test is -- a reasonable consumer is defined more broadly as what would a substantial

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amount of the consuming public view when they encounter this product? And based on that, I think I agree, we think of ice cream as flavors until we're shown otherwise.

So I'll stop digressing, but I think in the long of it, your Honor, based on even what's pled in the complaint, there's nothing indicating that this is the type of case that should survive a Rule 12. It doesn't fall under that camp that I talked about earlier.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thank you.

All right, counsel. So here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to go ahead and deem the motion made and decide it, and I can do that mainly because counsel on both sides have done a fine job of laying all out the relevant law, the relevant facts, and making this very clear, and that's something your clients should be grateful to you for because you've saved them a great deal of time and aggravation and frustration and expense by being good lawyers. And I thank you for that as well.

So with that in mind, I'm going to decide this. So defendant has moved to dismiss the claims under Rule 12. I'm not going to belabor the standard here. I'm familiar with what the standard is as set forth in so many cases taking the allegations of the complaint as true and drawing inferences in favor of the non-movant

which in this case is the plaintiff. Are the claims plausibly pled?

And this case is quite interesting. And as I indicated, there is an Article 3 standing argument as to other flavors I don't really need to deal with other than to say I don't believe that that's the case here in the Second Circuit. So I don't think that will carry the day.

But that doesn't matter because to get to the core of it, which is did the plaintiff, in buying an ice cream at a shop, a retail shop where it's sold by the scoop and so forth from a vat that is labeled simply with the word pistachio and nothing more, and that can be seen very clearly in the complaint on pages 4 and 5, your photographs, which are actually quite, quite helpful, could the plaintiff expect that by definition there would be pistachios in, or real pistachio ingredients in the ice cream? And I think the answer is no.

I'm going to say a few things here that relate to other cases. I do follow the line of case law that defendants have cited relating to vanilla in the southern district. And while there may be some differences (indiscernible) in Cruz v. D.F. Stauffer Biscuit Company, which is at 2021 WL 5119395, in this regard is quite instructive. All right? Those are the cases that hold

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   the word vanilla made representation about flavor rather
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   than the ingredient.
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              Now, the important thing here is there is no
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   representation made, and I even asked counsel if they
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   were to re-plead this case would they have anything
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   additional to add in terms of the quality of the
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   ingredient, the premium price at Cold Stone, is that
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   derived from representations about all-natural
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   ingredients or the highest? That's not the issue.
                                                         That.
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   hasn't been raised here (audio interference) --
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              MR. NASSIR: Your Honor?
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              THE COURT: Yes?
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              MR. NASSIR: Sorry, I wasn't sure if that was a
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   question.
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              THE COURT: It wasn't. Go ahead.
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              MR. NASSIR: My apologies.
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              THE COURT: (Audio interference) --
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              MR. NASSIR: Sorry, your Honor, you're cutting
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   out on my end. I deeply apologize.
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              THE COURT: (Audio interference).
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              MR. NASSIR: I'm sorry, I can't -- I'm not sure
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   if it's my line. The voice keeps going in and out on my
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   end.
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              MR. WILLEMS: You're cutting out on my end as
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   well, your Honor.
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                            Proceedings
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              THE COURT: (Audio interference).
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                       (Pause in proceedings)
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              MR. NASSIR: This is Joshua. Is anyone still
    on the line?
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              MR. WILLEMS: This is Kyle S. Willems.
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              THE CLERK: Okay, the judge is calling back in.
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    Just give him a second.
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              MR. WILLEMS: Okay.
              MR. NASSIR: Thank you.
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                       (Pause in proceedings)
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              THE COURT: Okay. So this is Judge Brown and
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    I'm back. I called in on a landline because obviously
    the cell service isn't working for me today.
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              So how much of what I said didn't you hear I
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    guess is my question?
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              MR. NASSIR: Thank you, your Honor.
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   Mr. Nassir. I caught your ruling but after you provided
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    your ruling is where it started to go in and out for me.
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              THE COURT: Oh yes, I was sort of still in the
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   middle of the ruling but I'll sort of pick up where I
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         And I think I know where you asked me a question so
   maybe I can take it from there. My staff also told me
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    they couldn't hear me either, so there we are.
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              So anyway, I had asked defense counsel, or I'm
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    sorry, plaintiff's counsel rather, whether or not there
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were additional facts, representations made about the quality of the ingredients. Right? Whether it was from actual, healthful, or anything like that and the answer is those sorts of representations are not available to us now. So that's not something that's at issue here.

And the question is the determination that this is a premium ice cream is based solely on price point.

And as we've discussed, price point could be based on a lot of things. So again, I think this goes back into the notion that consumers would not be deceived by the sole representation of pistachio.

Now, I was drawing everyone's attention to pages 4 and 5 of the complaint where there's a single word describing the ice cream flavor, pistachio. And again, those photos are very helpful. But you know, also in there is things like, and these aren't the best examples, but salted caramel and cotton candy, butter pecan. I don't think that someone buying those ice creams are necessarily saying oh there's definitely butter in there or there's definitely cotton candy. Probably not. Cotton candy is absolutely artificially flavored. So I don't think that these single word descriptions of the ice cream can reasonably be relied on by consumers or would be deemed as misleading to consumers.

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So I'm finding the claim implausible for that reason. And again, I'm relying largely in terms of the law on the D.F. Stauffer Biscuit Company case, ShopRite Supermarket cases, the cases dealing with vanilla as a flavor as compared to vanilla as a plant which is a vanilla bean. I think the same logic applies here to the pistachio cases.

So I'm going to find that the claims are not plausible. I am deeming the motion granted and made.

Now, I don't know where we kind of lost the audio record. I don't plan on writing this. If anybody wants a copy of my decision, you can obviously order the transcript of this conference.

Is there anything else I should deal with today?

MR. NASSIR: Your Honor, this is Mr. Nassir. I would ask just that in order to further prove our allegation as to what reasonable consumers expect, you know, we would respectfully request some time to conduct a consumer survey, you know, which would show consumers exactly the picture in the complaint and say that based on the representation and the appearance would you expect -- for example, we can isolate just one flavor if if your Honor would like it to be done differently, expect pistachio in the product. And I think that could

27 Proceedings maybe shed some light to support plaintiff's allegations 1 2 that when it comes to ice cream, people expect the 3 ingredients. That's --THE COURT: Well, that's interesting. Counsel, 4 5 what I would say is this. If you told me you had such a 6 survey, right, and you wanted to amend to include that, I 7 would say go ahead. But there's no way I'm going to give 8 you enough time to conduct a survey and redraft the complaint. I mean we don't have that sort of luxury. In 9 10 other words, I don't think you can get that done in 30 11 days, right? 12 MR. NASSIR: I believe I could get that done in 30 days, your Honor. 13 14 THE COURT: Wow. Okay. Well, let me hear 15 defendant on that before I say anything else. 16 MR. WILLEMS: Thank you, your Honor. Well, 17 first of all I would say that the Court has ruled on the 18 claims already so the time to seek to amend the complaint 19 properly would have been done before this, not after the 20 ruling. So I believe it's barred for that reason alone. 21 The second reason, if I go to the merits, you 22 know, there's cases that have these consumer surveys and still get dismissed on Rule 12 because they're still 23

going to have the same problem which is again, I talked

about what camp does it fall into and does a survey

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change the fact that it says it's a flavor on the signage, that it doesn't say made with or anything like that and it doesn't have any visual indication that it contains actual chunks of pistachio.

So I get the idea of a survey but it still doesn't get over the threshold issues that I raised that are common in cases where a Rule 12 motion was granted even in light of a survey.

THE COURT: Right. I hear you. So the real question that's being raised for me now, and I know you're all in the ice cream weeds as such, right, and I look at it from a broader perspective which is does plaintiff have the right to re-plead? And of course we all know the standards under Rule 15, it's very liberal, and federal courts like to give everyone an opportunity to be heard on the merits and so forth.

So here's what I'm going to do. I'm not going to rule one way or the other. I don't know that a survey gets you over the top. It may, it may not. But I will give you 30 days to file a proposed amended complaint and I would encourage you to recognize that such a filing is not aspirational. So if all you have at the end of that is a survey that says 10 percent of consumers thought there should have been pistachio in there, you know, I'd urge you to think with great care before you filed that.

29 Proceedings 1 On the other hand, there's suggestions of other 2 signage, the larger context, whatever. You know, I'm not 3 limiting what you can do. I'm not telling you what to do. But I will deem it dismissed without prejudice to 4 5 re-filing. But that's going to last a period of 30 days. 6 At the end of 30 days, if you don't re-file, which is 7 fine because that might be the right outcome if that's the right outcome, if you don't re-file, it will be 8 deemed to be with prejudice at that point. Does that 9 sound reasonable? 10 11 MR. NASSIR: Yes, your Honor. Thank you very 12 much. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Good. Anything else I can 14 do for you all today? 15 MR. WILLEMS: Not on behalf of the defense, 16 your Honor. Thank you for your time and attention. We 17 appreciate it. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. NASSIR: Not on behalf of plaintiff. 20 you, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. So let me just say, 22 reiterate what I said before just in case it got lost. 23 Counsel did a fine job on this. You really did a great 24 You made this easy to decide in the sense of by 25 being well prepared. And you should tell your clients

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                             Proceedings
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   that you saved everyone a lot of time and expense, so
 2
   that's a good thing. So that's good. And I'll ask you
 3
    to enjoy the rest of your summer. All right?
 4
              MR. NASSIR: Thank you, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Be well.
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              MR. WILLEMS: Thank you, your Honor.
 7
              THE COURT: Bye.
                          (Matter concluded)
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CERTIFICATE

I, MARY GRECO, hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of the said proceedings is a true and accurate transcript from the electronic sound-recording of the proceedings reduced to typewriting in the above-entitled matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this ${\tt 1st}$ day of ${\tt September}$, 2023.

Mary Areco
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